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C hapter  4
 Compresence versus 
Containment of the opposites
Anaxagoras’s claim that there is a share of everything in everything 
is at the very core of his metaphysics. Taken at face value, the claim 
sounds barely intelligible. Its brevity leaves much work to be done by 
the interpreters. Each of the very few words that appear in it, as well 
as the general metaphysical picture that the principle expresses, have 
been subject to much investigation in the scholarly literature, even 
since antiquity. Yet no consensus has been reached. The challenge 
is to understand not only what metaphysical position the principle 
expresses, but also how it fits with the other principles governing 
Anaxagoras’s ontology. I argued for a fresh line of interpretation in 
the preceding chapter, which I  now want to compare and contrast 
with the existing alternatives, to bring out further what is distinctive 
about it. Interestingly, ancient and modern scholars have converged 
on three main lines of interpretations of Anaxagoras’s principle that 
there is a share of everything in everything. They are the so- called 
Particulate, the Proportionate, and the Liquids interpretations.1 
On the Particulate interpretation, the fundamental elements of 
Anaxagoras’s ontology are conceived of as actually present as such in 
1.  Supporters of the particulate interpretation include among others Raven 
(1954), Guthrie (1965), and Kerferd (1969). Supporters of the proportionate interpre-
tation on the other hand include Strang (1963), Barnes (1979), Schofield (1980), and 
Mourelatos (1986). Sorabji’s (1988) interpretation and Lewis’s (2000) discussion of it 
are examined separately in  chapter 4.
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the extreme mixture out which of everything is composite, as mate-
rial (indivisible) particles of finite size which are too small to be per-
ceptually discerned as such. The mixture appears to be uniform, but 
it isn’t. On this interpretation, the qualitative variety of the existing 
stuffs is accounted for in terms of concentration of particles of differ-
ent kinds at different locations. On the Proportionate interpretation 
on the other hand, the total quantity of each type of fundamental ele-
ment is mixed together with the total quantities of the rest of them, 
in some proportion. The totality is a mixture that is uniform through 
and through, and the mixture is infinitely divisible. As has already 
been extensively discussed in the literature, both lines of interpre-
tation are prey to difficulties. They both lack positively supportive 
textual evidence and in fact conflict with some of the evidence we 
have.2 Additionally, they commit Anaxagoras to holding problem-
atic philosophical views. More recently, the discussion has received 
renewed attention from fresh suggestions made by Patricia Curd, and 
by Gareth Matthews in discussion with John Sisko. I group together 
the views of these three interpreters, even if they do not engage with 
each other directly, because they all share a mass logic approach to 
Anaxagoras’s ontology— this is their central innovation. For them, 
Anaxagoras is thinking of (actually existing) masses of stuffs being 
present in composite things, in variable quantities, as impurities 
that are everywhere in the things in question. This line of interpreta-
tion, which I refer to as the Liquids interpretation, differs from the 
Particulate interpretation because it does not postulate the existence 
of small particles of definite size, and from the Proportionate inter-
pretation because it does not postulate that the ingredients are pres-
ent in potentiality only. As my own interpretation, as presented in 
 chapter 3, assumes the divisibility of the opposites’ instances (as per 
NoLeast- P), I also engage in this chapter with the line of interpre-
tation according to which divisibility does no metaphysical work in 
2. As others have also noted, Anaxagoras does not mention either particles or 
proportion anywhere in the extant text; but this is not the only, or even main, textual 
difficulty affecting these interpretations.
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Anaxagoras’s system. The present chapter as a whole engages with 
the main existing readings of Anaxagoras’s principle that there is a 
share of everything in everything, aiming to offer further support for 
the substantial interpretative shift I introduced in  chapter 3.
4.1.   the ProPortIonAte InterPretAtIon
In this and the following section of the present chapter I will review 
the Proportionate and Particulate interpretations, in turn. The 
Proportionate interpretation, in essence, takes every constituted 
thing in Anaxagoras’s world to contain portions of everything else, 
where the portions are not present in each thing as distinct parts 
(or particles)— rather, they are present as proportions of kinds in a 
mixture.3 On this interpretation, Anaxagoras is using small and large 
to indicate the quantitative proportion of an item within the local or 
global mixture in which it is present. For instance, “The ‘smallness’ 
of, say, gold [in the global mixture] consists not in its being divided 
into minute particles, but rather in the simple fact that there is very 
little gold in the world” (thus Barnes 1982 [vol. 1, revised]: 23). It 
follows on this reading that when in B1 things are said to be “not 
visible ‘on account of smallness’ it means something like ‘on account 
of the small proportion of most substances relative to the propor-
tions of air and aether in the total mixture’; whereas ‘unlimited in 
smallness’ means something like ‘without limit on how small they 
[the substances] may be divided up’ ” (thus Schofield 1980: 77).4 The 
last explanatory remark made by Schofield amounts to the claim 
3.  There exist many formulations of this interpretation in the literature; for 
instance, Schofield describes the Proportionate interpretation thus:  “The ingredient 
portions of every sort of thing which are contained in each object or stretch of stuff of 
a given kind need not themselves take the form of parts individuated in the same gen-
eral fashion as objects or stretches, nor need they be distributed among such parts … 
they are to be thought of simply as proportions” (1980: 75).
4. By “substances” Schofield means the opposites. On the use of the term “sub-
stance” in relation to Anaxagoras, I share Curd’s concern voiced in (2010: 158, n. 11).
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that, for Anaxagoras, there is no limit on how small the proportion 
in which something is present in something else might be. On the 
Proportionate interpretation, the primordial mixture is thoroughly 
homogeneous, as no ingredients in it can be individuated as such, 
as a part of the mixture. Attributing this view to Anaxagoras how-
ever commits him to a stance that is not, and cannot, be his, as it 
entails that the ingredients exist in mixtures only potentially, and 
not actually, and thus could change from being in potentiality to 
being in actuality in certain circumstances. On the Proportionate 
interpretation the homogenous primordial mixture would be like, 
e.g., seawater, that is, (pure) water and salt through and through. 
Seawater contains a certain proportion (but no actual parts) of (pure) 
water and of salt; on the other hand, salt and water can be retrieved 
from it, so they exist potentially in the mixture, and could transi-
tion to actuality. We are now in the position to see two fundamen-
tal problems with the Proportionate interpretation. First, on this 
interpretation, Anaxagoras would be thinking that all the elements 
at the primordial stage of the universe are potential only.5 In addi-
tion to the “weakened” sense in which, on this interpretation, things 
would be in existence at the beginning of the development of the 
universe, the second and even more fundamental difficulty with the 
Proportionate interpretation is that the transition from potentiality 
to actuality presupposes the possibility of generation of something 
new, in a stronger sense than the Parmenidean strictures in play in 
Anaxagoras’s system allow, as we saw in  chapter 1. In conclusion, the 
Proportionate interpretation appears to be wanting, on account of 
5. In this connection, Schofield notes,
It might well be doubted whether the primordial state envisaged by the pro-
portionate interpretation is pluralistic enough. The interpretation affirms, of 
course, a plurality of kinds, existing as proportions of the total mixture. But is 
that existence more than potential— a promise that once the cosmogonic revolu-
tion begins, different objects and stretches of stuff of different sorts will be sep-
arated out? … [T] heir existence is still potential in comparison with the robust 
actuality of the particles of the rival interpretation. (1980: 78)
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these two main difficulties, and also on account of the absence of any 
explicit supportive textual evidence. We turn next to investigate the 
prospects of the Particulate interpretation.
4.2.   the PArtICul Ate InterPretAtIon
The Particulate interpretation is not prey to the concerns raised by 
the Proportionate interpretation:  for according to the former, the 
local and global mixtures contain actual ingredients as distinct parts 
or particles in them— and not only proportions, that is, ingredi-
ents in potentiality. Thus, on the Particulate interpretation, no pas-
sage from potentiality to actuality is posited. Hence both the local 
and global mixtures are heterogeneous, and not uniform (contrary 
to what the Proportionate interpretation postulates). Schofield 
reconstructs the considerations that motivate the Particulate 
interpretation thus:
In the beginning all things— i.e. all discrete individuals or bits of 
matter and all stretches of stuff (such as air and aither) which do 
not form discrete objects— were mixed together … as a single 
indistinct mass… . Anaxagoras may have thought that his accep-
tance (in F 17) of the Parmenidean interdict on the possibility of 
coming to be and perishing committed him to an original plural-
ity of discrete objects and stretches: if you don’t include an actual 
plurality in the original state of things, you will never be able to 
conjure one up at a subsequent stage. (1980: 70– 72)
Additionally, the Particulate interpretation facilitates our under-
standing of how the ingredients can move around in space in virtue 
of the vortex initiated by nous; the moving around in space of propor-
tions or potential entities is on the contrary difficult to make sense 
of. Generally, according to the Particulate interpretation, Anaxagoras 
uses small and large to indicate the actual physical dimensions of the 
AQ: Please 
note that 
nous appears 
in lower 
case same 
elsewhere 
and capital 
“N” for Nous 
is retained 
in Extracts 
and within 
Quotes.
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particles of the ingredients. In light of this, B1 is interpreted as say-
ing, in Schofield’s words, that
[in the original mixture t]here were different instances of different 
substances (and presumably of the same substance), but … these 
were too small or too indistinct to be discriminable by a human or 
animal eye. (1980: 68)
These are the main advantages of the Particulate interpretation. 
Nonetheless, there are also difficulties that have been raised against 
it in the literature. I  will here review two important arguments that 
were put forward by Jonathan Barnes and Edward Hussey respectively, 
as they will help us to gain a deeper understanding of the constraints 
that a sound interpretation has to satisfy. I  call them the Saturation 
Argument and the Containment Regress Argument.
4.2.1.  The Saturation Argument
This argument was developed by Barnes as a critique of the Particulate 
interpretation. It runs as follows:
If every piece of S contains a particle of S1, … then every piece of S 
is wholly composed of particles of S1— which is absurd. (1979: 255)
The challenge is that, in the spirit of Anaxagoras’s own principles, for 
every part of S there must be a part of S1 within it. On what rea-
soning, then, does Barnes hold that if every piece of S contains a par-
ticle of S1, every piece of S is then wholly composed of particles of S1? 
Consider: suppose that in a piece of S there is a particle of S1. Then 
either the S1 particle will be the whole of the S piece, which would 
conclude Barnes’s reasoning, or the S1 particle will be a proper part of 
the S piece, leaving an S- remainder piece.6 If the latter, there will be a 
6. The remainder piece will be a proper part of the original S piece, according to 
the weak Supplementation Principle of mereology (see, e.g., Simons 1987; Casati and 
Varzi 1999).
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further S1 particle in the S- remainder piece, and it will either be the 
whole of the S- remainder, or a proper part of it, and so on. Ultimately, 
in Barnes’s argument, the regress stops when there are no S- remainder 
pieces left in the S pieces, but only S pieces that are wholly7 com-
posed of S1 particles. Hence the charge of absurdity. But the validity 
of Barnes’s argument depends in fact on some further background 
assumptions that he does not make explicit. His argument is sound 
if we assume that S1 particles are finite in size, and that S divides 
into ultimate parts in which S1 particles fit exactly.8 Indeed, Barnes’s 
argument addresses only finite divisions of the mixants, because he 
intends it as a critique of the Particulate interpretation, which does 
not envisage unlimited smallness of particles, but only extreme small-
ness. Yet Anaxagoras tells us explicitly with NoLeast- P that all things 
are unlimited in smallness. If this is so, contrary to the Particulate 
interpretation, the pieces of S are unlimited in smallness, and so are 
the pieces S1. In that case, Barnes’s argument is not valid. The require-
ment, by hypothesis, that every piece of S contains a particle of S1 is 
satisfied, even if S1 particles are always taken to be proper parts of S 
pieces, leaving an S- remainder part, ad infinitum. In such a case, the 
conclusion that every piece of S is wholly composed of particles of 
S1 does not follow— there will always be smaller particles of S1 to fit 
pieces of S as their proper parts, leaving a proper part S- remainder. 
The Saturation Argument does not, as such, rule out this type of con-
tainment of one element in another. I now turn to explore whether 
such containment can satisfy the requirements of Anaxagoras’s ontol-
ogy, and consider the Containment Regress argument.
4.2.2.  The Containment Regress Argument
It might be thought that if one grants to Anaxagoras that all the ele-
ments are unlimited in smallness, which is what NoLeast- P states, 
7. Since by hypothesis every piece of S contains a particle of S1.
8. If the particles of S1 did not fit exactly in the smallest pieces of S, the argument 
would not be sound; there would S- remainders with no S1 particles in them.
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this would allow for a containment relation among the elements. 
On this hypothesis, each part of an element S would contain, not 
only a part of an element S1, but also a part of every kind of element 
there is in the ontology— of which, for Anaxagoras, there are many, 
if not unlimitedly many, kinds. Thus, given NoLeast- P, each piece 
of S would contain parts of S1, S2, S3, … as proper parts, while still 
leaving an S- remainder (since it is a piece of S), in every part of S, ad 
infinitum. Yet a different problem arises now, from the complexity of 
the structure of the contained elements. The difficulty comes about 
because it is not only S that contains parts of every type of funda-
mental element, but according to EE- P, every type of fundamental 
element contains parts of every type of fundamental element. What 
kind of structure emerges from the assumption of this type of con-
tainment? One that is barely intelligible. Expressing this thought, 
Hussey writes,
Within any lump of X, there is a “share” of Y. Either this “share” 
is present as a number of continuous packets, or not. If not, the 
visualisation fails already and it is hard to see how talk of quanti-
ties is to be justified. But if the “share” of Y is present in spatially 
continuous packets within X, there will presumably be “shares” 
of X, and everything else within the packets of Y, so that we are 
started on an infinite progression. This destroys the possibility 
of drawing any definite boundary between the X and the Y in the 
lump, be X and Y whichever ingredients they may, and this in 
turns destroys the notion of a packet with which the infinite pro-
gression has started. (1979: 137, my emphasis)
Hussey’s point is that if shares of each kind of stuff were within every 
share of every kind of stuff, the resulting configuration would lead to 
such a degree of structural complexity that, he concludes, we would 
lose track of the very notion of “contained unit.” If to this we add 
Anaxagoras’s proviso that each kind is unlimitedly small, with each 
unlimitedly small part containing a proper part of every kind of oppo-
site, then the structure defies representation:  each of the infinitely 
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many, infinitely divisible parts of each element contains proper 
parts of the infinitely many, qualitatively different kinds of element, 
with a remainder, and each of these (contained) proper parts con-
tains proper parts of the infinitely many, qualitatively different kinds 
of element, with remainders, and so on ad infinitum (horizontally 
and vertically). This is not an infinite series of regressive steps. It is a 
series in which countless infinities “sprout” at each step, and in each 
item of each such infinity, further infinities “sprout,” and so forth. 
This complexity becomes incomprehensible within the first couple 
steps of reasoning. Because of this , it is plausible to rule out that this 
is what Anaxagoras’s ontology looked like. Even if one might want 
to entertain that Anaxagoras could accept a nonintelligible world, 
this interpretation is unsustainable. On the account of containment 
just sketched, there is nothing that could differentiate one kind of 
element from another. Thus the type of containment just envisaged 
undermines the intelligibility of any attempt to construe different 
kinds of element as constituted of every kind of element. By contrast, 
Anaxagoras’s ontology does require the fundamental building blocks 
to be of different kinds.9 In conclusion neither the Proportionate 
nor the Particulate interpretation delivers a sound interpretation of 
Anaxagoras’s views— both are prey to difficulties, and neither sits 
well with the textual evidence. On account of these considerations, 
other attempts have been made in the scholarly literature. To these 
we now turn.
4.3.   the lIQuIds model
The impasse in the debate between the Proportionate and the 
Particulate interpretation has more recently motivated a fresh dis-
cussion which develops the idea that the ingredients of things are 
9. On my proposed interpretation, the fundamental building blocks of different 
kinds are the opposites. As we will see, they are not composed of each other nor do the 
mixtures of the opposites change their constitution.
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present in them as masses, not as particles of definite size (as, for 
instance, in the case of a mixture of salt and pepper) nor as fused con-
stituents (as in the case of sugar in a cake). This mass logic approach 
may be visualized by means of a liquids model. The idea has been 
explored since antiquity,10 but it has been most recently and most 
fully developed by Patricia Curd. She describes this interpretative 
approach to Anaxagoras’s EE- P thus:
The ingredients are like pastes or liquids; they are all mixed or 
smeared together such that all the ingredients are in every pos-
sible place in some concentration or other. Even though every-
thing is unlimitedly small, and the mixture a thorough one, the 
mix need not be uniform; the concentrations of the various 
ingredients can vary in density or intensity in different places, 
but all of them have some non- zero density at every place… . We 
should think of the basic things as like liquids or pastes that flow 
together and occupy the same volume of space. (2010: 181, 184)
Note that liquids do not mix like salt and pepper, or like salt and 
water, or water and wine. Rightly, Curd is not appealing to the special 
way that we know liquids mix— which Anaxagoras would not have 
known— by dissolving one another’s molecular bonds. Anaxagoras’s 
fundamental elements cannot change one another, and they do not 
change, apart from their location. Rather, Curd finds in liquids a 
familiar example of how masses mix, which allows that the ingredi-
ents in the mix retain their own individuality (so they are not in the 
mixture only as potential entities), and yet that they can occupy the 
same space (so Barnes’s Saturation Argument does not apply here). 
So on Curd’s interpretation, what is it to be unlimitedly small, when 
recast in terms of masses? If their unlimited smallness facilitates the 
thoroughness of the mixture (as we know from Anaxagoras’s line of 
10. As we will see in  chapter 6, the Stoics give water and wine as one of their 
examples of colocation.
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reasoning in B6),11 we need to understand what the units of, e.g., 
liquid are, ontologically. Are they collections of distinct unlimitedly 
small droplets? Curd explicitly rejects this line of thinking:
I don’t think the particulate model is the correct interpreta-
tion. If Anaxagorean stuffs are not particulate, then “small” and 
“large,” at least here in B3 and B6 (and in B1 and B2 as well), do 
not refer to the size of a piece or drop or bit of an ingredient. 
(2010: 183– 84)
How are we then to understand the smallness of the ingredients on 
the Liquids model? Curd writes,
I take “small” and “large” in this context as a way for Anaxagoras 
to speak of submergence in and emergence from the background 
mixture of all things. (2010: 184)
Accordingly, she reads NoLeast- P as saying that “there is no limit 
on how submerged in the mix an ingredient can be” (2010: 184). For 
instance, gold in my flesh is very small, “I.e. its density is so low that 
it is submerged in the rest of the ingredients, and so it is not mani-
fest” (2010: 184).12 Before proceeding with the analysis of this last 
claim by Curd, I should mention that the Liquids model entails that 
the density of the ingredients cannot change. The reason is that liq-
uids are not compressible, and so we cannot fit more of a liquid in 
a given volume of that liquid. For this model to help us understand 
11. B6: “Since it is not possible that there is a least, it would not be possible that 
anything be separated, not come to be by itself, but just as in the beginning, now too 
all things are together” (ὅτε τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἲναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι, 
οὐδ᾽ἂν ἐφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ὅπωσπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ).
12. Curd adds that her interpretation is close to Inwood’s, who defines “smallness” 
as “the characteristic of being mixed and so not distinguishable from other stuffs” 
(1986: 22). See also Curd (2010: 187): “I am not suggesting that by ‘large’ and ‘small’ 
Anaxagoras means ‘emergent’ or ‘submerged.’ … Rather, in certain cases we should 
understand that what it is for something to be small just is for it to be of such density 
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Anaxagoras’s ontology, it would have to develop a conception of a liq-
uid that could change in density. Without such a development of the 
model, when Curd talks about changes in the density of an ingredient 
in the mixture, this can only be in relation to the amount of any other 
ingredient in that mixture rather in relation to itself, by becoming 
more dense; this is in line with P- P, which refers to the amounts of 
ingredients in relation to other ingredients.13 Now, to the concept of 
submergence. We should not take submergence to mean dissolving. 
This is because Curd wants the Anaxagorean ingredients to be recog-
nizable as such, when they are manifest in sufficiently high concen-
trations. She does not want the ingredients to be potentially present 
in the mixture. In that sense she is not a proponent of the traditional 
Proportionate interpretation. But her ingredients are present in 
mixtures in certain proportions, as we saw in her example of gold in 
my flesh. To pay full justice to Curd’s interpretation, we need to put 
together the claim that the ingredients do not dissolve in the mixture 
(namely, that they are not in potentiality in the mixture) with the 
claim that the terms “large” and “small” do not refer to the sizes of 
pieces or drops or bits of an ingredient. So if we think of her inter-
pretation as being illustrated by, e.g., a water- and- oil mixture, how 
are we to think of the water and the oil in the mixture? It should be 
possible for either ingredient to be in a large proportion in relation to 
the other ingredient in the mixture, or in a small proportion. The dif-
ference in proportion between them could be so big that, for practical 
purposes, in the one case the mixture could be thought of as being 
water, with the oil submerged, and in the other it could be thought of 
as being oil, with the water submerged. Let us consider the mixture in 
or concentration that it is submerged in the mix and so is not apparent or evident. 
Context must determine the appropriate sense.” I see important differences between 
Curd’s and Inwood’s interpretation and I will discussion the latter in conjunction with 
Furth’s (1991) as a distinctive interpretative proposal in section 4.4. of this chapter.
13.  The only difficulty that might arise for Curd’s stance on this issue is with 
Anaxagoras’s claim that some ingredients can be compacted. For instance, “From the 
earth stones are compacted by the cold” (B16). This phenomenon would require a 
Liquids model that allows for density changes.
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which the oil is submerged. The oil is not in the mixture in very small 
droplets, or bits, or pieces, as we know from Curd (quoted above).14 
Extrapolating from Curd’s pastes simile (2010: 181), we could per-
haps think of the liquids as being in the mixture as malleable bodies. 
The problem is that the differences in the oil and the water cannot 
be that here the oil is more dense than there, since liquids or pastes 
cannot vary in their densities in the proposed model; a mixture can 
contain more or less of one of them, but it would accordingly displace 
another liquid or paste. So the submergence of an ingredient could 
not be achieved by reducing its density in the mix.
I admit that I find it difficult to put together all the metaphori-
cal descriptions of the Liquids interpretation given by Curd into an 
account that accommodates Anaxagoras’s claims about the ingre-
dients in the mixture. I also find it difficult to understand how the 
liquids can supposedly occupy the same volume of space in the mix-
ture. We need to bear in mind that they do not dissolve one another, 
because then they would exist only potentially in the mixture. 
Similarly, pastes (that do not dissolve each other, thereby remain-
ing only potentially in the mixture) do not occupy the same volume 
of space. Typically, when pastes or liquids get mixed together, they 
come to occupy together a volume that is the sum of the volumes that 
each of them occupied separately. If the pastes do not dissolve each 
other, then when mixed they must displace one another (rather than 
occupy the same space), and end up being juxtaposed (even if not 
in the same way as salt and pepper, because we are thinking here in 
terms of masses). In sum, I cannot see how one can derive the coloca-
tion of ingredients in the mixture through the Liquids interpretation.
A further difficulty I  find with the Liquids interpretation is in 
its understanding of Anaxagoras’s claim in B1. Given Curd’s pro-
posed understanding of “small,” it follows that she would explain 
Anaxagoras’s claim that in the original mixtures all things were 
14.  Strictly, Curd does not say that they are not in droplets, etc., but that by 
“small,” Anaxagoras does not mean the size of droplets, etc.
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unlimited in smallness as meaning that all things in the mixture were 
unlimitedly submerged, along the following lines:
In certain cases we should understand that what it is for some-
thing to be small just is for it to be of such a density or concen-
tration that it is submerged in the mix and so is not apparent 
or evident… . In all three instances of the word here [i.e., in 
B1], “small” apparently has its specialized sense of “submerged.” 
(2010: 87)
What “unlimitedly submerged” would mean here is not perspicuous. 
For argument’s sake, let us take Curd’s view to be that for Anaxagoras 
all things in the original mixture were everywhere in unlimit-
edly small concentrations or densities. The question is:  why would 
Anaxagoras want to make such a claim? All he needs for the original 
mixture to be as he describes it is that no ingredient is predominant, 
and hence (perceptually) evident. So each ingredient in the mixture 
has to be small, in the sense of being submerged in the mixture. But 
why should Anaxagoras want to additionally claim that each ingredi-
ent is unlimitedly small in the mixture? If we look closely at B1, we 
see Anaxagoras is reported to have made in fact two distinct claims:
[1] All things were together, unlimited in amount and in small-
ness, for the small, too, was unlimited. [2] And because all things 
were together, nothing was evident on account of smallness.
[1] ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα. 
καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. [2] καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν 
ἔνδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος
Claim [2] says that the ingredients are small and hence not evident. 
But claim [1] says that the ingredients are unlimitedly small, not qua 
nonevident, but because there is no limit to smallness. I submit that 
it is difficult to explain claim [1] on the submergence interpretation, 
because Anaxagoras explicitly holds in claim [2] that the smallness 
of the ingredients is sufficient for their nonevidence. So one has to 
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allow, with Curd, two senses of “small” (and “large”) in Anaxagoras’s 
text— in size, and in submergence.
We are not yet however in the position to assess the overall pros-
pects of the mass logic approach that Curd develops, as this approach 
holds promise in some other respects. Gareth Matthews argues that 
this approach can help address a challenging problem in Anaxagoras’s 
ontology which arises from EE- P. How there can be qualitatively dif-
ferent kinds of things in an ontology where everything is in every-
thing? The problem is generated by the combination of EE- P and 
NoLeast- P with P- P, which we examined in  chapter 2. Specifically, is 
there room for P- P in an ontology governed by EE- P and NoLeast- 
P? Matthews (2002 and 2005), who implicitly adopts the same mass 
logic approach as Curd,15 poses the problem in the following terms:
My watch chain is “most plainly” gold if, and only if, my watch 
chain contains more pure gold than anything else it contains. 
But, if [on account of EE- P] there is no such thing as pure gold, 
my watch chain will not contain more of that than anything else, 
there being no such thing as that. (2002: 1)
Note that Matthews does not assume that it is part of the nature of 
each ingredient of the mixture to contain other stuff as part of its con-
stitution, as it was assumed in the Containment Regress argument 
in section 4.2. Rather, on Matthews’s reading, other kinds of stuff 
are mixed, as impurities, with each kind of stuff. On this assumption, 
Matthews proposes that we can, in Anaxagoras’s system, form the 
conception of a pure kind of stuff from the recognition that impure 
stuff can be purified, even if not completely, at least approximately. 
Thus, although it will never be the case that we will reach pure, e.g., 
gold, there can be purer and purer gold— refined gold. For example, 
15. I am not here concerned with settling who was the first to put forward the 
mass logic approach to Anaxagoras’s ontology; it is interesting to note that Curd does 
not engage with Matthews’s views although her translation (2007) follows the publica-
tion of Matthews’s articles.
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the mixture out of which Matthews’s watch chain is made is that of 
a golden object because, although successive refinements of gold will 
never yield pure gold, they will increasingly converge on an amount 
of refined gold that will be greater than the amount of dross that will 
be generated by the refinement process. This gives us a way to think 
of the chain as being “most plainly” gold if, and only if, it contains 
more refined gold than dross, even if the refined gold is not quite 
pure.16 In response to Matthews, and in response to an even more 
complex analysis (in Barnes 1982) and a further generalized version 
of the recursive refinement, John Sisko (2005) argues that on this 
reasoning the position we are left with is that
no process of recursive refinement— not monadic, not dyadic, 
not polyadic recursive refinement— can be used to determine 
specifically how much gold is in a bar of gold. Matthews’s proposal 
fails, Barnes’s proposal fails, and no other proposal that relies on 
recursive refinement can ever succeed. (2005: 244)
My own response to this line of interpretation is that Matthews 
assumes that the process of refinement filters most, even if not all, of 
the impurities out of an ingredient in the mixture. But Anaxagoras’s 
elements are unlimitedly small, as per NoLeast- P. Anaxagoras also 
holds that the elements are unlimitedly large in amount, as per 
NoLargest- P— so what he means by their unlimited smallness is 
not their total quantity, which is unlimitedly large, but that they are 
each divided into unlimitedly small parts. As we saw in  chapter  3, 
this means that their parts are as numerous as the points in a line:17 
16. Matthews’s proposal is also compatible with either the particulate or the pro-
portionate model of explanation of the mixture. My discussion of his position here will 
not address either of these two versions one could develop of Matthews’s arguments, 
since both the particulate and the proportionate interpretations have been found 
problematic in the scholarly literature, as reviewed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 above.
17.  This is of course only an analogy, since points are not parts of a line; the 
important aspect of the analogy is the numerosity of the points, rather than their 
ontological status.
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if a mixture of r and g is like the overlap of a red and a green line, the 
notion of refining the red line by filtering most of the green points out 
of it would not be applicable— there would always remain as many 
green points in it as we started with. Explaining the preponderance 
of elements in a mixture in view of their unlimited smallness may 
be more Anaxagoras’s problem than Matthews’s, but it follows that, 
given the unlimited smallness of the mixants, Matthews’s recursive 
refinement cannot explain the preponderance of Anaxagorean (con-
tinuum dense) mixants.
4.4.   the no- dIvIsIBIlIt y InterPretAtIon
I will finally examine an existing alternative interpretation that most 
directly contrasts with mine, and that has been put forward with 
interesting arguments in the recent secondary literature. At the core 
of this alternative is the thought that Anaxagoras did not think at 
all in terms of infinite divisibility of the fundamental items in his 
ontology, but rather in terms of composition and segregation of 
mixtures, in line with his contemporary Empedocles. On this alter-
native interpretation, Anaxagoras qualifies the elements as “small” 
when intending to indicate that they are in a state of mixture, and 
thereby imperceptible. I call this the No- Divisibility interpretation. 
In Brad Inwood’s words, “There is no need to posit infinite divis-
ibility for Anaxagoras” (1986:  18).18 Although a number of schol-
ars hold this view, I  here limit myself to engaging with the work 
of Brad Inwood (1986) and Montgomery Furth (1991), with refer-
ence also to Malcolm Schofield (1980) as a representative selection. 
I cannot fully pay justice here to each version of the No- Divisibility 
18. Part and parcel of Inwood’s line of argument in support of the nondivision 
interpretation is the view that “it is historically implausible that he should have con-
ceived of infinite divisibility” (1986: 32– 33). My response to this strand of the argu-
ment leans on Mansfeld’s (1979) studies of the historical data, in particular in respect 
of the relation between Anaxagoras and Zeno; see also the appendix to this chapter.
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interpretation that each of these scholars has developed. In lieu of 
that, I  will respond to their common line of thinking by focusing 
on Anaxagoras’s own arguments which make clear, in my view, the 
metaphysical work that divisibility does in his system, and why divis-
ibility is needed for Anaxagoras’s desired conclusions. In doing this, 
I will discuss some representative alternative readings of the relevant 
texts put forward by the proponents of the No- Divisibility interpre-
tation, and show where they do not sit well with the extant evidence.
The thrust of the No- Divisibility interpretation is that “small-
ness” means being mixed, and “largeness,” being manifest. Furth, for 
instance, puts the claim in these terms:
[Anaxagoras’s] notions of Large and Small have a theoretical 
application which is distinct from … their ordinary- life appli-
cation to spatial size, and in particular they have nothing to 
do with infinite divisibility as everyone from Aristotle on has 
thought. (1991: 97)
Yet, looking at Anaxagoras’s texts and the reasoning of his arguments, 
it is very difficult to imagine how one can understand them merely 
in terms of mixture and manifestedness. Consider, for instance, B5 
(which we discussed at length in  chapter 3):
Even though these things have been dissociated in this way, it 
is right to recognize that all things are in no way less or more 
(for it is impossible that they be more than all), but all things are 
always equal.
Τούτων δὲ οὕτω διακεκριμένων γινώσκειν χρή, ὅτι πάντα οὐδὲν 
ἐλάσσω ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πλείω (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλείω εἲναι), 
ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα ἀεί.
Separation does not make what they are separated from less, since 
it is unlimited, or make their totality less, since the totality remains 
the same. Importantly, increasing their number by the separation 
does not make them more, since the total amount remains the same. 
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Although in the final justification Anaxagoras says that “it is impos-
sible that they be more than all,” he could have also added, for the 
sake of symmetry, that it is impossible that they be less than all. 
Generally, I take Anaxagoras’s argument to be that any division does 
not increase or decrease the total. By contrast, Furth explains the 
reasoning in Anaxagoras’s argument thus:
Changes in the manifestness or “largeness” do not involve any 
change in the number of the properties, which is a primitive, 
fixed given, already at the absolute maximum. I  think some 
such thought is the obvious moral of fragment 5, a very pretty 
piece of reasoning about the place of “less” and “more”:  It is 
necessary to recognize that all things are not in any way 
less … or more … (“for it cannot be accomplished” that 
there be more … than all) … but all things are always equal. 
(1991: 118, boldface in the original)
Let me first note that, if this is what Anaxagoras is saying here, 
namely that when something becomes large and manifest its num-
ber does not change, it is not clear why Anaxagoras would think 
he needed to state it at all— this is an evident and uncontroversial 
point. Second, when Anaxagoras says διακεκριμένον, even if he had 
meant “manifest,” he could not have reasoned as Furth says he does. 
The reason why becoming manifest would not have increased the 
number of properties is not that their number is fixed as a constant 
in nature and that it is at an absolute maximum. Rather, the reason 
why becoming large and manifest does not change its number is that 
it is only a change in size— the now large and manifest was before 
smaller and unmanifest.
Turning now to Furth’s rendition of what he refers to as a “very 
pretty piece of reasoning,” contrast the way Furth reports the argu-
ment above and how the full argument reads in the original frag-
ment B5. In reporting the argument, Furth leaves out its initial 
assumption:  “Even though these things have been dissociated in 
this way.” Furth understands this assumption as saying that things 
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become manifest, which of course does not make them “less or 
more.” Importantly, the omission changes the line of reasoning in 
Anaxagoras’s argument. Whereas Anaxagoras is exploring in the 
argument what happens to the quantity of a thing when increasing 
its number by dividing its quantity, Furth reverses the logic of it, 
as if Anaxagoras examined what happens to the number of a thing 
when its quantity increases, which is not problematic. By contrast, 
Anaxagoras is investigating the relation of the number of a thing to 
its total quantity, rather than its size, and concludes that division 
increases the number, but does not change the quantity. The sig-
nificance of the argument’s conclusion is lost in Furth’s rendition of 
Anaxagoras’s reasoning, which may partly explain why Furth does 
not see the relevance of division in Anaxagoras’s ontology. I will not 
pursue the discussion of Furth’s interpretation further here.
Brad Inwood on the other hand reads a tautology in Anaxagoras’s 
argument in B5:
Each one is always equal to itself, being neither less nor greater 
than it is. It is better to see this as repeating the main point of 
fragment 3, that each χρῆμα has equal bigness and smallness, 
rather than to take it as merely saying tautologically that there 
are as many kinds of χρηματα as there are. (1986: 30– 31)
This is a surprising conclusion, since Inwood’s translation of the argu-
ment is this: “These things having been distinguished thus, one must 
recognize that all are in no way lesser or more” (1986: 30). The apo-
dosis by itself is tautological, but there is also a hypothesis that must 
be taken into account. Anaxagoras is not considering how things are, 
as such, but what happens when, to use Inwood’s translation, “these 
things have been distinguished.” What difference does distinguish-
ing these things make, to Inwood’s mind, which leads Anaxagoras to 
wonder whether distinguishing them makes things lesser or more? 
The answer is not perspicuous.
An additional difficulty with Inwood’s version of the No- Division 
interpretation is this: how are we to understand Anaxagoras’s claim 
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(in Inwood’s translation), “Nor is there something which is itself the 
least of the small”? Inwood proceeds to offer this explanation: “On 
my hypothesis this states that there is no limit to how thoroughly 
things can be mixed” (1986: 29). But what is a thorough mixture? 
Inwood does not explain. In lieu of an explanation, he associates 
smallness with thorough mixture:
I would hypothesize that the smallness, for the χρήματα [pairs 
of opposites, wet- dry, hot- cold, etc.], is simply the condition of 
being thoroughly distributed in the mixture. There need be no 
reference to the size of discreet particles, as the traditional the-
ory … requires. (1986: 24)
Let us assume, with Inwood, that being thoroughly mixed is being 
thoroughly distributed in the mixture. The question is: what does it 
mean to be thoroughly distributed? One hypothesis could be that it 
means being everywhere in the mixture. But in what sense is some-
thing that is everywhere small? Where then would what is large be, 
and how would it be different from the small? In what sense is the 
small distributed? Is this an articulated entity that is scattered, or 
is it a continuous entity? If articulated, into what? If continuous, 
in what sense is it mixed with other such continuous entities in the 
same regions, namely, everywhere? Finally and importantly, if an 
item is everywhere when thoroughly distributed, how can there be 
degrees of it? How can we understand that there is “no limit to how 
thoroughly things can be mixed”? I will not pursue the investigation 
of the No- Division interpretation further, as I believe that the dif-
ficulties I have raised for it make it clear that it is not a promising 
interpretation.
4.5.   ClosIng remArK s
We saw that Anaxagoras likes his paradoxes— he says, for instance, 
in B1 that each of the opposites, e.g., the hot, the dry, etc., is 
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unlimitedly large and unlimitedly small. Their largeness is generally 
understood as the total amount of each opposite in the universe. 
Their smallness has been interpreted in the scholarly literature in 
different ways, namely in terms of there being very small particles 
(or masses), or very small proportions of each type of thing in the 
extreme mixture of everything in everything. The conclusion we are 
in the position to draw at this stage, having examined the main 
interpretations existing in the literature, is that we cannot under-
stand Anaxagoras’s ontology, as governed by EE- P, NoLeast- P, 
and P- P, in terms of elements (whether conceived as particles 
or as mass) containing one another ad infinitum, or as somehow 
merged into a blend in which the elements are present as propor-
tions. Recall Hussey’s Containment Regress argument, to the effect 
that Anaxagoras does not have the conceptual tools to preserve the 
qualitative differences among kinds of stuff, if each contains all the 
others, because they all become constitutionally “fuzzy.” I  submit 
that the argument applies to any interpretation that reads EE- P 
as a relation of containment, whether we think of proportions or 
masses or particles.
Could we really understand the Anaxagorean mixture if it had 
such a structure? If each type of thing contains in its constitu-
tion every other of the infinitely many types of thing that exist in 
Anaxagoras’s ontology, the mixture becomes unimaginably com-
plex, on account of NoLeast- P, unable to differentiate between 
different kinds of thing. The structure of matter will be of at least 
aleph- 1 complexity— that is, it will have at least aleph- 1 regresses, 
of aleph- 1 cardinality each. Every part of, e.g., gold would be divis-
ible into aleph- 1 parts of gold, each of these parts would contain 
bits of aleph- 0 kinds in it, and each bit would have aleph- 1 parts of 
its own kind, each of which would be further divisible … and so on 
and so forth. A regress of unimaginable complexity follows. Hence, 
we cannot begin to understand difference in kind between these 
things.
My conclusion is that the problem in so understanding Anaxagoras’s 
ontology lies in the notion of constitutional containment. We need a 
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fresh start. My proposal as presented in  chapter 3 draws on a largely 
overlooked part of the textual evidence, where Anaxagoras phrases EE- P 
in terms of the elements that make up his ontology as being compresent 
with one another, rather than as contained in one another. It offers an 
account of Anaxagoras’s ontology that is not based on constitutional 
containment, but rather necessary compresence of the opposites, facili-
tated by the fact that the opposites exist as divided gunk.
4.A .  APPendIX : Zeno’s Argument 
From multItude
Controversy has developed in the secondary literature on whether 
Anaxagoras was responding to Zeno’s arguments, or Zeno to Anaxagoras’s. 
John Palmer (2009) recently argued that Anaxagoras was responding to 
Zeno, and I here adopt this line as my working hypothesis.19 One of the argu-
ments that Zeno of Elea developed is of particular relevance to our under-
standing of Anaxagoras’s ontology at this stage of our investigation. The 
argument, an ancestor of the Bradley’s regress, is this:
If there are many things, entities are unlimited; for there are always 
other entities between entities, and again others between those. 
And thus entities are unlimited.20
εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων 
ἐστί, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἕτερα μεταξύ. καὶ οὕτως ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί.
It is here not possible to pay justice to the argument as such and the impor-
tant scholarly discussion that centers on it. Palmer (2009: 243 ff.) suggests 
that Anaxagoras was influenced by this Zenonean argument, and thinks it 
makes sense to suppose that Anaxagoras would have conceived of EE- P in 
19.  There is evidence that Anaxagoras had an even more sophisticated under-
standing of the infinite than Zeno, insofar as Zeno believed, but Anaxagoras rightly did 
not believe, that if the many things are just as many as they are, they are finitely many. 
Many things can be just as many as they are and be infinitely many, since being infi-
nitely many is not the outcome of change, e.g., of increase in number, as Zeno thought. 
See, for instance, Palmer (2009: 245– 46). For more on the issue of Anaxagoras’s dates 
as such see Mansfeld (1990).
20. Fragment 3, in Palmer’s (2009) translation.
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terms of a containment relation among elements, precisely in reply to Zeno’s 
argument. Palmer explains, in support of this interpretation, that if each 
element contained parts of every element, this would avoid commitment to 
the separateness and distinctness of each element from the others. If the 
elements are neither separate nor distinct from one another, they are not 
vulnerable to the Zenonean regress above, because they are not many; hence, 
there are no in “between” entities, since the elements are not separate and 
distinct. By contrast, on my interpretation of Anaxagoras, his physical sys-
tem can resist the Zenonean regress on account of the compresence of the 
elements, rather than on account of their mutual containment.
In thinking about whether the containment or the compresence inter-
pretation avoids the Zenonean regress, my concern is with the density of 
the continuum. One can distinguish a point, and individuate it, as we do in 
mathematics, but can the point be separate from other points? I gave reasons 
to doubt that it can (in section 3.1.2). One can think of a part that is distinct 
and separate in a whole, e.g., a student in a class; and an entity can be distinct 
and separate from another entity it overlaps with; e.g., the neutrinos that go 
through us all the time are distinct from us, even while they momentarily 
overlap with us. But in neither case is there an assumption of continuum 
density. Zeno’s argument does not explicitly specify either distinctness or 
separateness, but only the multitude of the entities. Furthermore, there is 
no conclusive historical and/ or textual evidence that Anaxagoras was devel-
oping his ontology as an answer to Zeno’s argument from multitude quoted 
above. It suffices to note here that even if Anaxagoras was responding to 
Zeno’s argument from multitude with his cosmic mixture of elements, we 
have found no reason to assume that this led him to favor the containment 
over the compresence interpretation, or even vice versa.
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